("plant humidity sensor" finally was harmless enough for them).Or is it?
;D I should get a PO-Box in the Netherlands to "measure the impulse response"("plant humidity sensor" finally was harmless enough for them).Or is it?
Maybe you're a big 'green grass' supplier ;) 8) 8) 8) ;D
China suppliers love this, The only question they ask is did you paid?
You're forgetting where they ask which fake marking you want.You're saying it as if a wide variety of choice is a bad thing.
Digikey are checking orders against the US Denied Persons list and holding orders until you can prove your generic name is not that person on the list.Have you ever had problems with things like credit cards? People with very common names often do, and it doesn't matter much if you have a distinctive middle name. Even having a common initial can be problem. In London Patel is a common surname, and a lot of the given names that go with Patel begin with S. Friends have told me that if your name is S Patel, regardless of what the S stands for, you'll get credit check related issues from time to time.
Also, Element14 doing a similar thing.
What's all the fuss about here? Isn't this simply typical ordinary and expected government bungling up what may have been a sensible idea at some point in the distant past? They do the same thing in a hundred other areas. But those areas aren't the topic of the EEVblog forums. You guys creack me up. :-DDIf it were just the governments bungling up another thing, it wouldn't be so bad. The problem is that we're currently engaged in large scale security theatre. This distracts from the actual problem, causes all sorts of issues for law abiding citizens and happens at the expense of huge amounts of tax monetary units.
I work for a company with operations worldwide, including a few "Controlled Countries". We must be very careful about what is exchanged (both hardware and software, IP, etc.) with CC people. We have whole gangs of lawyers dealing with this to keep us out of trouble.
The scariest thing is that these rules supposed to prevent stuff getting into the hands of bad guys is being so incompetently administered.That's what's so devious about security theatre.
The scariest thing is that these rules supposed to prevent stuff getting into the hands of bad guys is being so incompetently administered.This stuff never works, Corruption and other issues keep these rules from wroking.
... security theatre.
Isn't this simply typical ordinary and expected government bungling up what may have been a sensible idea at some point in the distant past?If it's all "simply typical and expected", then why the evasive language?
Expect I am out of line with most people's thinking but I would rather details were checked than be blown up by some lunatic fanatic.
Expect I am out of line with most people's thinking but I would rather details were checked than be blown up by some lunatic fanatic. Governments share watch list data, so I can see why things might be checked, even outside the US, against a US list. Ask yourself would you rather have a plot foiled in Australia based on US intelligence, or not foiled because only the local list was used?The problem is that there is no proof that these things have any positive effect. Worse still, there is proof that it's actually detrimental to security, due to an overload of information gumming up the works, and seeding radicalization.
David Jones, if it were not on the list, might be a good choice of pseudonym. Someone claiming to be Dave going down to the chemists for say, some sulphuric acid, some nitric acid, some glycerol, a lump of clay and a box of soda ash might elicit the response "no worries, he's just going blast fishing" whereas it they were anyone else it might be viewed differently.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40604543 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40604543) or https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/28/britain-foiled-terror-attacks-plots-police-counter-terrorism-security-services (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/28/britain-foiled-terror-attacks-plots-police-counter-terrorism-security-services)
First name and last name like in Dave's case is a pretty crude flag, I can imagine what it's like for John Smith or Mohammed Khan or Zhang Wei.
A friend had his boarding card tagged for secondary screening each time he went to the US. I was dumb enough to check in with him in Dallas one day. After that my boarding card was tagged for secondary screening each time I went to the US. I am well aware that this is not an isolated case. This is how dumb and theatrical the whole system is. They put their resources into endless rechecking of people who are not showing any signs of being a problem, which means they have no time to look for real threats.Expect I am out of line with most people's thinking but I would rather details were checked than be blown up by some lunatic fanatic.
Firstly : that's all very well, but if they're reacting to common false positives, they're wasting their time. Could be spent on something useful instead and be more effective.
Secondly: You might think differently if they have a non-innocent Mike Willis on the checklist. Not because of the suspicion, but because of the sheer waste of your time.
Digikey are checking orders against the US Denied Persons list and holding orders until you can prove your generic name is not that person on the list.
Also, Element14 doing a similar thing.