Lion Air crash: Jakarta Boeing 737 'had prior instrument error'

[MT]

Boeing shares plummeting like MAX several days in a row.........(terrible as a joke but as a fact is true).

Boeing claims MCAS new software version to come.

[GeorgeOfTheJungle]

Boeing claims MCAS new software version to come.

An OTA update?

[MT]

Boeing claims MCAS new software version to come.

An OTA update?

Good greif noooo, after the crash.

[raptor1956]

Boeing claims MCAS new software version to come.

An OTA update?

I really hope there's no way an OTA update could happen and expose the AC to hacking potential.  Imagine the next Bin Laden with a team of hackers devising a new "Planes Plan" with no risk to any of his people.

I have to believe the update would need to be done by Boeing employees and only Boeing employees and only on the ground.


Brian

[james_s]

I would be less worried about terrorists than by all the other things that could go wrong with an OTA update. I've seen countless gadgets bricked by that sort of thing going wrong. Pretty sure they have the sense not to design such a mechanism into an aircraft though.


As a side note, I really wish the ease of updating we have today had never been developed. It's sold on the benefits of being able to easily fix bugs and add features in the future. Unfortunately what it has done is enabled a mentality of ship the minimum viable product and finish it "later". Sorry but when I buy something I expect it to work as advertised out of the box, and to keep working until I decide to replace it. I'm not going to buy something based on promises of features to be added at some later date, and I don't want updates introducing new bugs and breaking/removing/changing features I use.

[Kjelt]

As a side note, I really wish the ease of updating we have today had never been developed. It's sold on the benefits of being able to easily fix bugs and add features in the future. Unfortunately what it has done is enabled a mentality of ship the minimum viable product and finish it "later". Sorry but when I buy something I expect it to work as advertised out of the box, and to keep working until I decide to replace it.

I agree fully. Unfortunately this is now common practice in consumer electronics because the product development cycles has been cut at least in three compared to ten years ago.
New features are a must have in time for the next product launch otherwise the marketing team has to wait for the next time window which often is half a year or even one year and by then the competition will already sold their unfinished products.

I just hope for all our sake this is not the case for the firmware in new aircrafts.

[raptor1956]

If Boeing is to assure everyone that the 737 MAX 8 is safe, they can simply get their CxO on board one with its Pitot tube clogged and AoA sensor disabled, then hire two average 737 pilots that do not have intimate knowledge on MCAS and its quirks to fly it. I'm sure news agencies worldwide will report this intrepid action and clear their name.

That's better than any spokesmen.

If Boeing were a Japanese company then doing what you said would be almost likely but very few companies act as the Japanese do in situations like this.  In fact, as the Tepco Fukushima thing demonstrated, the Japanese way isn't always practiced by the Japanese.

So the rumor is that Boeing has a MCAS update coming -- when might that be.  The problem Boeing has here is that no matter what they do they are going to be sued big time for both crashes.  On the one hand, they might have preferred this second accident never happened so they could distance themselves from the Lionair crash and a year from now if they rolled out an update they might uncouple it from the Lionair incident and, perhaps, avoid the worst of the legal problems, but with this second accident they will now have to update MCAS and soon and it will be hard for them to prove it was just an incidental thing.  Not doing something will end the 737 MAx program right now. 

Boeing is going to be eaten alive by lawyers and if the Lionair case was bad this new one probably triples what they can expect to pay and it could be 10X.  Yes yes, we don't know the MCAS was involved in this new case, not for sure anyway, but even professionals in the airline industry are pretty sure MCAS played a role.  It's not out or reach for this to take down Boeing altogether leaving only one major player in the game.  I doubt that will happen, but it is certainly a possibility.  The saving grace for Boeing may be there military contracts and the fact that those military relationships may make them 'to important to fail' by the US government.  Airbus would love that to happen as would many others in the world with a hardon against the USA, but as touch and go as it might be I don't see them fold because of this.


Brian

[MT]

your analogy to Fukushima stumbles.

https://gizmodo.com/boeing-promises-to-release-software-update-for-737-max-1833224836
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130402

For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer. This includes updates to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law, pilot displays, operation manuals and crew training. The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority.

[raptor1956]

your analogy to Fukushima stumbles.

https://gizmodo.com/boeing-promises-to-release-software-update-for-737-max-1833224836
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130402

For the past several months and in the aftermath of Lion Air Flight 610, Boeing has been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer. This includes updates to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law, pilot displays, operation manuals and crew training. The enhanced flight control law incorporates angle of attack (AOA) inputs, limits stabilizer trim commands in response to an erroneous angle of attack reading, and provides a limit to the stabilizer command in order to retain elevator authority.

I think you misunderstood my reference to Fukushima -- it wasn't about an malfeasance by Boeing but that the execs at Tepco displayed an un-Japanese practice of not putting your skin on the line as blueskull alluded to. 

Boeing has, prior to this latest crash, promised an update but has been less than forthcoming about when it will be delivered.  This new incident will not permit them to delay this and it also makes it harder for them to uncouple the update with the crashes that happened. 


Brian

[MT]

Well thats what i have doubts about a "un japanese action". I think Japanese is as much as cowards as rest of us are when it comes to self preservation, all this CEO crying and apologizing in public a silly show based on wicked ideas about cultural behavior, send them to jail instead.

[GeorgeOfTheJungle]

A bug in the MCAS that pushes the nose down too far, overriding the pilot's nose up command, is that it, then, it seems?

[MT]

I really hope there's no way an OTA update could happen and expose the AC to hacking potential.  Imagine the next Bin Laden with a team of hackers devising a new "Planes Plan" with no risk to any of his people.

I have to believe the update would need to be done by Boeing employees and only Boeing employees and only on the ground. Brian

imagine CIA instead!

[james_s]

Well thats what i have doubts about a "un japanese action". I think Japanese is as much as cowards as rest of us are when it comes to self preservation, all this CEO crying and apologizing in public a silly show based on wicked ideas about cultural behavior, send them to jail instead.

In the wake of the JAL 123 crash the president of the airline resigned, an engineer and the maintenance manager killed themselves. I don't think that would happen had it been a US based airline for example.

[MT]

In the wake of the JAL 123 crash the president of the airline resigned, an engineer and the maintenance manager killed themselves. I don't think that would happen had it been a US based airline for example.

Nor an European, they would try squirm them self out like the  Lufthansa CEO did when Germanwings crash hapend.
JAL 123 crash voice recording is something to listen to, how the pilots doing all they can to save the rudder fin less oscillating 747.
Then the rescue team on the ground screwed things up so some could had been saved died.

cockpit voice recording

[EEVblog]

Boeing has, prior to this latest crash, promised an update but has been less than forthcoming about when it will be delivered.  This new incident will not permit them to delay this and it also makes it harder for them to uncouple the update with the crashes that happened. 

No way to avoid that.

[raptor1956]

Boeing has, prior to this latest crash, promised an update but has been less than forthcoming about when it will be delivered.  This new incident will not permit them to delay this and it also makes it harder for them to uncouple the update with the crashes that happened. 

No way to avoid that.

Nope ... There's going to be a generation of lawyers able to retire earlier than expected.


Brian

[BradC]

I can't see how these could be isolated incidents. I wonder if other unreported incidents have occurred that were dealt with relatively uneventfully by following the manual?

Is there a mandatory reporting procedure for dealing with anomalies in-flight?

While being completely different, from a functionality perspective this doesn't seem that far off the 737 rudder reversal issues.

[Nusa]

Is there a mandatory reporting procedure for dealing with anomalies in-flight?

Yes, pretty much everything abnormal in aviation requires some kind of reporting, although the consequences of not doing so may vary depending on the countries involved.

The demand for "quick fix" software updates runs squarely into the legally mandated development process for mission-critical avionics software. This is combined with the slow release of diagnostic information from accident investigations. Boeing presumably gets access to raw data prior to public release, but it still takes time to digest correctly and remains subject to NTSB (and other agency) recommendations/demands that may or may not have been met by premature action.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avionics_software#Regulatory_issues

None of that can be skipped, so it takes time. Doing it right trumps doing it fast.

[djacobow]

I can't see how these could be isolated incidents. I wonder if other unreported incidents have occurred that were dealt with relatively uneventfully by following the manual?

Is there a mandatory reporting procedure for dealing with anomalies in-flight?

While being completely different, from a functionality perspective this doesn't seem that far off the 737 rudder reversal issues.

Well, of course, we'll know when we know. But I am starting to think that they could just be isolated incidents. First, I just can't wrap my head around the idea that, given what happened with Lionair, that any 737 driver, including this crew, would be absolutely primed to handle a runaway stab problem by putting the system in cutout as per the flight manual. It just defies reason that the crew would find itself unprepared for a LionAir type scenario. The second reason is that an eyewitness claims he saw smoke on the way down.

Anyway, all speculation at this point. They have the CVR and FDR, so they'll know soon enough.

[raptor1956]

Is there a mandatory reporting procedure for dealing with anomalies in-flight?

Yes, pretty much everything abnormal in aviation requires some kind of reporting, although the consequences of not doing so may vary depending on the countries involved.

The demand for "quick fix" software updates runs squarely into the legally mandated development process for mission-critical avionics software. This is combined with the slow release of diagnostic information from accident investigations. Boeing presumably gets access to raw data prior to public release, but it still takes time to digest correctly and remains subject to NTSB (and other agency) recommendations/demands that may or may not have been met by premature action.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avionics_software#Regulatory_issues

None of that can be skipped, so it takes time. Doing it right trumps doing it fast.

Yes and that's the quandary that Boeing is in right now -- they may have a handle on the problem and a solution to it but the process, which is not only understandable but necessary, may necessitate taking longer to jump through those hoops.  My guess is that Boeing was aware of the potential for a problem before they shipped the first one but they must have felt the runaway stabilizer protocol was sufficient.  I have to say the fact that the system can command a nose down trim hen so close to the ground on only the data from one side and without reference to the other side seems criminal to me -- when the system is in doubt don't take control from the pilots. 

I can see two fixes for this:  the first, the bandaid, will be software only or if hardware is includes the hardware changes will be minor; the second one may require a third system to monitor both sides and act as an arbiter if there's a difference.  If one side could see what the other side sees from the beginning I fail to see how they could have designed the software NOT to look at the other side and not command nose down at low altitude if there's a disagreement.

Another aspect of this that boggles my mind is that the system puts stall prevention above everything, even a steep nose down attitude at low altitude.  And, once again, the idea that this AC isn't fly-by-wire is a distinction without a difference.  If the computer can interfere with the pilots control actions and override them it's kind of hard to say this isn't fly-by-wire now is it. 


Brian

[raptor1956]

I can't see how these could be isolated incidents. I wonder if other unreported incidents have occurred that were dealt with relatively uneventfully by following the manual?

Is there a mandatory reporting procedure for dealing with anomalies in-flight?

While being completely different, from a functionality perspective this doesn't seem that far off the 737 rudder reversal issues.

Well, of course, we'll know when we know. But I am starting to think that they could just be isolated incidents. First, I just can't wrap my head around the idea that, given what happened with Lionair, that any 737 driver, including this crew, would be absolutely primed to handle a runaway stab problem by putting the system in cutout as per the flight manual. It just defies reason that the crew would find itself unprepared for a LionAir type scenario. The second reason is that an eyewitness claims he saw smoke on the way down.

Anyway, all speculation at this point. They have the CVR and FDR, so they'll know soon enough.

I saw that reference to a witness claiming smoke, but as I mentioned, witness testimony is the lowest form of evidence and its common for a dozen witness to the same event describe them a dozen different and incompatible ways.  People are dreadful witnesses...


Brian

[FrankBuss]

I don't understand why the FAA doesn't ground the 737, as many other countries do. Do they wait for a 3rd crash to be sure that there is something wrong with the plane?

[Kjelt]

I don't understand why the FAA doesn't ground the 737, as many other countries do. Do they wait for a 3rd crash to be sure that there is something wrong with the plane?

Me neither, better safe than sorry, esp. when there are 100+ lives involved each incident.
It "feels" like there are some business/politic entanglements there 

But on the other hand since there is no final outcome of the investigation yet they can only take preventive measures.
It could well be a pilot error in one of the cases due to the new plane, or is there already some hard evidence out there ?

[Homer J Simpson]

[FrankBuss]

Right, I think the video explains it. In short, and what I've read elsewhere: The jet engines were not designed for this plane, but they used it anyway, maybe to save some money. So it doesn't really fly stable without software correction, because they are mounted at the wrong position. The software depends on sensor inputs, and I've read these AOA sensors are not redundant and can fail. If this happens, the pilot has to understand that this is the problem, and then do 3 non-obvious steps to counteract that the nose dips and that it falls out of the sky.