Reading the Preliminary Report, previous flight did OK:
"Airspeed unreliable and alt disagree shown after take off. STS was also running to the wrong direction, suspected because of speed difference. Identified that CAPT instrument was unreliable and handover control to FO. Continue NNC of Airspeed Unreliable and ALT disagree."
"... the airline confirmed one of their maintenance engineers was on board of the aircraft during the accident flight. This was an "anticipatory measure" in the event of technical problems with the new aircraft."
A third opinion who may have added confusion or given wrong instructions or flipped a breaker.
I'm of the view Boeing has blood on their hands for the engineering.
One of the many questions put forth to the FAA by
The Aviation Herald:
- Why was the MCAS permitted to operate on the base of a single AoA value showing too high angle of attacks? Why does the MCAS not consider the other AoA value?
This is a failure of the software algorithm and fault tree analysis. Can't think of one reason to keep the robot going. AoA also seems to feed corrections to airspeed and altitude.
The forum poster, about knowing to shut off a system you don't even know about:
"As a captain on Boeing 737, I feel betrayed about Boeing's statements about their documentation. Even as of now, the MCAS has not been incorporated into the FCOM, nor into the FCTM. Their press release is a shameless lie."