Lion Air crash: Jakarta Boeing 737 'had prior instrument error'

[djacobow]

You take it too personally, Djacobow.

:-)

Serious question: What it takes seconds for an MCAS malfunction to do, how long does it take to undo that after you cut the stab trim? After you cut the stab trim you can't just press the up button on the yoke anymore, right? You have cut all powered control over the jack screw and the horizontal stabilizer. It looks like you'd be turning the wheel for a long time.

Yes, a reasonably long time. I'm a bit surprised that nobody has uploaded a YT video that shows how long it takes to move the trim 2.5 degrees. The wheel spins fast under trim control and just by grabbing the wheel you probably can't even go 1/3 as fast. However, the wheel has a flip-out knob, that you can grab to crank it much faster. I guess it goes as fast as you'd want. My guess is that it would take roughly 2x as long as the trim motors when you're using the knob.

As for pilot reaction: If you are used to hearing this thing clacking away during autopilot trim adjustments, then you might not notice it, at all? During AF447, the audio stall warning went off 70 times for over 2 minutes, and the black box recordings suggest that the pilots never even discussed a stall. Some studies have suggested that audio warnings don't register to the pilot under many circumstances, which is why most of the important alerts are not audio, only.

Fair point. I think it's true that people focus on one thing to the exclusion of others, and this is a known problem in aviation. I didn't know the thing about sound in particular. Information saturation and other sorts of "data absorption" problems have been studied a fair bit in the context of instrument flying: instrument fixation, instrument omission, etc. There's also a lot of work around how long it takes a pilot to work out which instrument has failed. This is something you practice when instrument training, but under pressure, in hard IMC, with a debilitated airplane is a lot different, it has definitely proven fatally difficult.

I had not heard much about people tuning out klaxons, bells, and audio in particular, but to a first approximation, I'd think I'd almost have to tune them out in order to think.

AF447 makes an interesting comparison. The pilot flying may not have known he was stalling because he might not have thought it was possible. Normally, the Airbus provides envelope protection, which means you can yank back on the control stick and the plane will climb at the highest rate it can do so safely. However, because of the pitot fault there was no air data and the computer punted to alternate law without envelope protection. There would have been a screen indication, but who knows if the pilot would have understood it.

AF447, though, is also an example where a pilot could have flown this airplane out of the situation. "All" the pilots needed to do was fall back to early training, attitude flying: pitch + power = performance.

But I also understand why this would have exceedingly difficult: one moment you're monitoring a plane cruising on autopilot, the next moment you are hand-flying a plane not just manually, but one without air data and without the normal FBW characteristics of the A320. I can only imagine it's a jarring and difficult transition.

To my gut, I think I'd rather have the MCAS situation,, but I'm not sure it's productive to compare totally different incidents in totally different airplanes.

[thm_w]

Is it just me, or does anyone else think that there's something immoral about Boeing designating functionality that is for the sole purpose of increased flight safety (such as the "disagree light") as "optional" and charging extra for it?  And thus allowing corporate airline customers to opt-out of paying for it to be implemented in their aircraft?  Comfort and operational economy options, sure.  But items that can only be classified as "safety-related" and designed to notify when the rest of the aircraft isn't performing up to its paid-for specifications at the potential expense of all the lives aboard?  Apparently, Boeing has a corporate policy which holds that not all passengers deserve equal levels of flight safety.

Automatic braking systems and lane assist are options on cars that are purely for safety. It costs money to implement these things, someone has to pay for it.

[ogden]

Video explaining and possibly answering questions regarding horizontal trim and MCAS:

[james_s]

Post by Ralph Nader, who apparently lost a relative in one of the crashes.

Greedy Boeing’s Avoidable Design and Software Time Bombs

That's Ralph Nader though, he made a career of criticizing products, greatly exaggerating their flaws. The most famous probably being the Chevy Corvair which was a surprisingly innovative car years ahead of its time. It had some unusual handling characteristics but it was not inherently dangerous for what it was, a car designed to be affordable and fuel efficient with the technology available at the time.

[james_s]

Is it just me, or does anyone else think that there's something immoral about Boeing designating functionality that is for the sole purpose of increased flight safety (such as the "disagree light") as "optional" and charging extra for it?  And thus allowing corporate airline customers to opt-out of paying for it to be implemented in their aircraft?  Comfort and operational economy options, sure.  But items that can only be classified as "safety-related" and designed to notify when the rest of the aircraft isn't performing up to its paid-for specifications at the potential expense of all the lives aboard?  Apparently, Boeing has a corporate policy which holds that not all passengers deserve equal levels of flight safety.

Automatic braking systems and lane assist are options on cars that are purely for safety. It costs money to implement these things, someone has to pay for it.

I can see both sides here, however in the case of the sensor disagree warning it sounds as if it's purely a software change. Now charging additional money to unlock a software feature is nothing new but I can see the argument over it being a safety feature that should be included standard rather than charging extra.

Automatic braking and lane departure systems require additional hardware that must be included in the car and they're less necessary IMHO than something intended to monitor for fault conditions. A person who pays attention when they drive doesn't need automatic braking or lane departure warnings, but it would be silly for a car manufacture to charge extra money for the brake system failure indicator.

[KL27x]

You can charge for ABS because the DOT says it is legal to sell and drive cars without ABS. At one point cars didn't require a chest belt in the rear seat or air bags up front.

Just like the FAA cleared the MAX plane as fine without the AOA disagree warning.

I don't think the disagree light is the problem, though. Nor a display. Prior to the MAX, the AOA on a 737 was only ever used to activate a stick shaker. So a malfunction might have erroneously made the stick shake and nothing more? And these two crashes were not stalls.

Nondisclosure of MCAS is a problem. MCAS able to erroneously retrigger without any absolute limit is a problem.

Lack of ability to turn off MCAS is another problem. Stab trim cutout to kill MCAS is like cutting off your arm to spite your hand.

[james_s]

I think the reasoning behind not having a separate way of disabling MCAS is that without it the plane does not handle the same as other variants of the 737 and the system is intended to be transparent and effectively part of the trim system. I don't know that having to shut off power to the trim system is too unreasonable in that context which assumes that MCAS is going to behave sensibly. I mean in an Airbus plane you can't shut off envelope protection entirely, the automated systems are considered integral to the flight controls. Quite a few military fighter aircraft are inherently unstable and would drop out of the sky without the automated control systems so you can't shut those off either.

If it turns out that the MCAS system is responsible for these crashes I think the sensible thing to do is redesign it so that it cannot trim down to such an extreme that the pilot cannot override the pitch down trim with up elevator and then come up with a way to make it far more failsafe. I'm fairly confident that a solution can be engineered that will solve whatever problem exists. Boeing knows that they have one shot at this and another related crash after the design is corrected will have a far greater impact.

[KL27x]

I don't know that having to shut off power to the trim system is too unreasonable in that context which assumes that MCAS is going to behave sensibly. I mean in an Airbus plane you can't shut off envelope protection entirely, the automated systems are considered integral to the flight controls.

The pilot might not be able to turn off certain protections on the Airbus. But these systems will turn off, automatically, if vital sensors fail, else they might contribute to a problem due to erroneous information. The MCAS doesn't automatically shutoff, even if you had purchased this AOA disagree alert upgrade. It just means you have to see it and then shut off your trim control and break out the crank handle, lol. Since at the time of the first crash, Boeing didn't even tell anyone about MCAS, an AOA failure alert would not have even resulted in any response. "Oh the AOA's don't agree. I'll stop relying on my AOA readings, is all. I never looked at that, anyway. Carry on." They wouldn't have cut the power to trim control to preempt a faulty MCAS response, because MCAS wouldn't even have been in their vocabulary.

Engineering standpoint: it seems barbaric the way MCAS works to begin with. How or why a 2.5 degree stabilizer response would ALWAYS be appropriate seems insanely crude. Matter not where the stabilizer started at, nor what the pilots may have already begun doing with the elevators, nor what the pilot has perhaps started doing with the elevators after MCAS started its one, crude, barbaric, quantum response. What if the AOA changes and says the AOA is normal and/or at least on the way down (due to faulty sensor or wind turbulence or whatnot.. or because the pilot had already applied full down elevators before reaching the AOA limit where MCAS kicked in)? Does the thing just continue cranking to 2.5 degrees down, anyway, and as soon as it's done it is ready for the next triggering? I mean, damn, the way it is described, I could write that software. Anyone could whip that up in an afternoon. And I think most engineers would see why it could be a problem.

Also it seems insane that MCAS makes this permanent and huge change to prevent the stall. Then it just leaves the stabilizer there. And Boeing doesn't think anyone needs to know. If the pilot had approached the stall because he accidentally turned the trim up by 2.5 degrees, unwittingly, and then didn't notice that the MCAS turned it back down to about "normal," then yeah, that would be a great behind-the-scenes response that the pilots need not be aware of. I mean, if the pilot inadvertently pressed the trim up button for 10 seconds and then immediately went unconscious for the the next minute, that would be perfect. In 99% of proper activation, this wouldn't be the case. And I bet the MAX with 2.5 degree nose down trim and no longer in a stall is going to handle a little differently than a normal 737. I suppose the pilot should be automatically executing the grab-the-wheel, cut the stab trim routine the instant it starts... since he is unaware it is supposed to happen. Then fix the plane from stalling, manually.

[rdl]

Doomed Boeing planes lacked two optional safety features

Safety feature.
Optional.
Extra cost.
 

“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham, told the newspaper. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”

I bet there are people at Boeing who now wish they had made both standard equipment.

[Dundarave]

That's Ralph Nader though, he made a career of criticizing products, greatly exaggerating their flaws. The most famous probably being the Chevy Corvair which was a surprisingly innovative car years ahead of its time. It had some unusual handling characteristics but it was not inherently dangerous for what it was, a car designed to be affordable and fuel efficient with the technology available at the time.

And as a result of "greatly exaggerating their flaws", Ralph Nader was instrumental in the introduction of mandatory seatbelts in the US and Canada, as well as the introduction of collapsible steering wheels (among other influential changes), both innovations resulting in saving the lives of many thousands of people.  Unsafe At Any Speed was the book that started his "career of criticizing products".

<incorrect quote attribution corrected - apologies.>

[rdl]

That's Ralph Nader though, he made a career of criticizing products, greatly exaggerating their flaws.
...

And as a result of "greatly exaggerating their flaws", Ralph Nader was instrumental in the introduction of mandatory seatbelts in the US and Canada...

Well, I'm not the one who said that, but it's no big deal.

I did already know who Ralph Nader is. I had a Corvair as a daily driver for a while back in the late seventies. It was fine until a wheel fell off.

If you go to his site to read his comments about "Greedy Boeing", the post "Letter to the FCC Commissioners" is also pretty good.

[Kjelt]

yet people think nothing of getting into a car.

Oh there we go again comparing anything to cars 
If you do want to compare it you should look at only those accidents with:
- a professional driver
- no alcohol involved
- no other cars or other vehicles/pedestrians involved
- no corners or bad roads, not within city limits (a straight highway without other traffic)
- no speeding or other traffic violations like crossing red lights etc.

If you look at all this the chance of a passenger surviving such an accident with all the safety precautions like airbags, belts, crackle zones is way higher than any passenger in a plane accident.
( please put your head between your legs and brace for impact and oh yeah we put the chairs so close to eachother anyone taller than 1m85 will probably hit the seat in front of him first, nice knowing you). Individual Passenger safety in a plane is the same as in the 50s , it has even been made worse by stuffing more and more people per square meter in that flying can.

[GeorgeOfTheJungle]

the Chevy Corvair which was a surprisingly innovative car years ahead of its time.

Nothing in the Corvair was "surprisingly innovative" or ahead of its time. No thing at all. It was just an exercise of cost cutting by bolting down together the worst of the worse to make it cheap, as cheap and bad as a Renault 8 in the 60's or a Dauphine (its predecessor) in the 50's. The only time I've seen on the road with my own eyes a car rolling over for no reason, it was an R8. There's nothing worse when cornering than that swing axle suspension https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renault_Dauphine#Technical

The rear swing axle design, unless ameliorated by any of several options, can allow rear tires to undergo large camber changes during fast cornering, leading to oversteer – a dynamically unstable condition in which a vehicle can lose control and spin. Renault relied on a front anti-roll bar as well as tire pressure differential to eliminate oversteer characteristics – low front and high rear tire pressure — and induce understeer. The tire pressure differential strategy offered the disadvantage that owners and mechanics could inadvertently but easily re-introduce oversteer characteristics by over-inflating the front tires. In the United States, drivers (and General Motors) experienced virtually the same issues with the Chevrolet Corvair. In 1960 Renault revised the suspension with the addition of extra rubber springs up front and auxiliary air spring units (mounted inboard of the conventional coils) at the rear – marketing the system as Aerostable[18] – and giving the rear wheels a small degree of negative camber and increased cornering grip

[tooki]

So, operating under the assumption that MCAS is what failed, my take on this is that Boeing screwed the pooch in the implementation of MCAS.

he thing is, having an inherently aerodynamically unstable airframe and using software to make it what I'll call "apparently stable" to the pilots is a completely valid design approach. (Think of the Segway scooter, which is only possible because of software.)

I absolutely agree... some forms of instability can definitely be patched with control systems, and the segway is a great example.... I would never claim otherwise.. but if you're going to do that, the system has to be fit for purpose...

And when we are talking about a plane where a critical error kills everyone on board, that system has to be robust and it has to be incapable of killing people no matter what you throw at it.

Yes. I think I kinda alluded to all of that in the sentence that followed the quote, namely "So, operating under the assumption that MCAS is what failed, my take on this is that Boeing screwed the pooch in the implementation of MCAS."

And when you're talking about a massive complex thing like a plane where pilots have to be able to override the system if it's going wrong, well you also have to be frank and open about what the plane is, how it actually works, and how it might be different from other planes you've ttold people it's the same thing as..

Yep. I was only talking about the equipment deficiencies, not the training and processes.

Both of these flaws have to be in place at the same time for the crashes to happen in the way we suspect as of right now. Fixing either one would have prevented the crashes. And both are comparatively easy to fix, so if I were Boeing, I'd fix both.

you'd also have to fix the documentation and the training and probably the plane type, but yes I agree, if the MCAS could be made to not fall down in a screaming heap and kill everyone on board, it could possibly be a suitable fix for the planes physical instability, as long as people piloting the plane were fully aware of what it was doing, why it was there, and had some experience flying the plane without it enabled.

What do you mean by "fix the… plane type"?

Also, whoever let the plane design out with such obvious holes  in the design needs to be seriously investigated (like, did anyone even consider a basic system level FMEA on this thing? that should have pointed out the issue with only one mechanical vane sensor being used as bright as day!)

Yep. As I said, I was only addressing the equipment. But you're right that a root cause analysis will expose the organizational deficiencies that allowed such sloppy work to go out, and it's not gonna look good for Boeing!

[tooki]

As I said before, I am not sure this plane will fly again with the same name.
It has a bad reputation and people don't want to fly in it anymore.

You've said it before, and I'll say again that there's a zero percent chance this will happen.

The DC10, for example,

Lets continue over a year and we will see.
Referring to planes of the 70s makes no sense, society has changed too much esp social media, internet....
If airliners are cancelling orders it looks bad, I can't say I can blame them.

Nah. People have always been skeptical of aviation, and so mob mentality around failures has been a constant companion to the industry, even pre-social-media. So yeah, the DC10 is still a valid example.

Airlines cancel orders all the time. It's just basic risk reduction. They'll re-order (the same or something else) once the dust has cleared.

(FYI: "Airliner" means a passenger aircraft for public carriage by an airline. "Airline" means a company who operates such flights.)

[james_s]

Nothing in the Corvair was "surprisingly innovative" or ahead of its time. No thing at all. It was just an exercise of cost cutting by bolting down together the worst of the worse to make it cheap, as cheap and bad as a Renault 8 in the 60's or a Dauphine (its predecessor) in the 50's. The only time I've seen on the road with my own eyes a car rolling over for no reason, it was an R8. There's nothing worse when cornering than that swing axle suspension

Clearly you've never driven one, and are not particularly familiar with other American cars of the time. In the era of big lumbering front engine iron V8 powered cars the Corvair came along with a rear mounted alloy case air cooled horizontally opposed 6 cylinder, it was like nothing else out of Detroit at the time. They also offered one of the very first turbocharged engines in a consumer vehicle decades before Saab refined and popularized the technology. It was incredibly innovative for GM, a radical departure from the status quo. Yes it was cheaply made, it was designed to be affordable, it was designed to be fuel efficient which meant small and light weight. It was not high end, but it was nowhere near as bad as many people think based only off Nader's book having never even seen a real Corvair up close. They were no less safe than countless other low cost cars of the era.

[tooki]

You can charge for ABS because the DOT says it is legal to sell and drive cars without ABS. At one point cars didn't require a chest belt in the rear seat or air bags up front.

You're confusing ABS and collision avoidance systems, aka autonomous emergency braking (AEB).

This was the original statement:

Automatic braking systems and lane assist are options on cars that are purely for safety. It costs money to implement these things, someone has to pay for it.

By automatic braking system, he means AEB, where the car uses sensors to identify obstacles ahead and apply the brakes automatically. (Sort of an always-on extension of the hardware used for adaptive cruise control.) This is not required by law.

ABS means anti-lock braking system, where the car will automatically pulse the brakes to prevent the wheels from spinning out, retaining steering control in a skid. ABS has been mandatory on all new cars in the EU since 2004, and it's been de-facto mandatory in USA since 2012, when electronic stability control (ESC) became mandatory on new cars. (ESC builds upon ABS, adding more sensors and computing, and the ability for the system to apply brake power, not only release it.) ESC has been mandatory in the EU since 2014.

[james_s]

yet people think nothing of getting into a car.

Oh there we go again comparing anything to cars 
If you do want to compare it you should look at only those accidents with:
- a professional driver
- no alcohol involved
- no other cars or other vehicles/pedestrians involved
- no corners or bad roads, not within city limits (a straight highway without other traffic)
- no speeding or other traffic violations like crossing red lights etc.

If you look at all this the chance of a passenger surviving such an accident with all the safety precautions like airbags, belts, crackle zones is way higher than any passenger in a plane accident.
( please put your head between your legs and brace for impact and oh yeah we put the chairs so close to eachother anyone taller than 1m85 will probably hit the seat in front of him first, nice knowing you). Individual Passenger safety in a plane is the same as in the 50s , it has even been made worse by stuffing more and more people per square meter in that flying can.

So are you asserting that getting into a car is less likely to kill you than getting onto an airliner? I'm not sure you understand how statistics work. What does the chance of surviving an accident have to do with this? The plane is far less likely to crash so even if you have a 99% chance of surviving a car crash and a 1% chance of surviving a plane crash the plane is still far less likely to kill you because plane crashes are extremely rare. They are so incredibly rare that whenever one happens it is front page news and we discuss the incident in threads like this. There are thousands of car crashes every day and many thousands of people die for other reasons every day. Yes having a professional driver would improve your safety, but how many people have one of those? Avoiding drugs and alcohol is obviously a big help, so is putting down the mobile phone but none of that helps when some other idiot hits you, and it happens, every single day.

Don't want to compare it to cars? Fine, here are the top 10 causes of accidental death from 2016. Maybe you can point out where airliner crash is on that list because I don't see it.


    Poisoning (including drug overdose): 64,795, +11.1%
    Motor vehicle: 40,231, -0.2%
    Falls: 36,338, +4.8%
    Suffocation by ingestion, inhalation: 5,216, +8%
    Drowning: 3,709, -2%
    Fires, flames, smoke: 2,812, +3%
    Mechanical suffocation: 1,730, -2.9%
    Natural heat, cold: 1,269, +6.7%
    Struck by, against: 806, +2%, and
    Machinery: 572, -6.2%.

[Kjelt]

So are you asserting that getting into a car is less likely to kill you than getting onto an airliner?

No. I say a car an sich as a vehicle is more safe than an airplane.
It is the circumstances that make it less safe and statistically have more deaths.
That is what i am saying and take for instance the Ford Pinto which was a very unsafe car because if hit from behind the fueltank could explode was avoided and abandoned by customers.
Which is probably what is going to happen to the MAX since for instance in Holland there were three MAX planes from TUI and after the accident people who booked their flight on one of these planes were massively cancelling their trip.
That was the discussion.

I'm not sure you understand how statistics work.

I know exactly how statistics work and the most important thing is to differentiate from the main subject to investigate vs all circumstantial parameters.
So the subject was NOT is driving a car safer than flying a plane, that was what you made of it so you could make a point. It was is a car safer than a plane.
Yes ofcourse it is, if something malfunctions on a plane in air and you can not control it anymore it is almost 99% game over. In a car it is not since you are still on the ground, you have crackle zones, airbags etc.
So all I am saying is that if a plane has a bad track record people are going to avoid flying on such a plane, that's all.
If they rename the plane and it has a longer safer track record than people will start flying again.
Pure social psychology.

[apis]

Yes ofcourse it is, if something malfunctions on a plane in air and you can not control it anymore it is almost 99% game over. In a car it is not since you are still on the ground, you have crackle zones, airbags etc.

Cars are also much more likely to crash into something, since they are still on the ground.

[Kjelt]

Yes ofcourse it is, if something malfunctions on a plane in air and you can not control it anymore it is almost 99% game over. In a car it is not since you are still on the ground, you have crackle zones, airbags etc.

Cars are also much more likely to crash into something, since they are still on the ground.

Yes those are the other parameters as discussed, which is why an autonomous driving car is so much more difficult than an autopilot on a plane.
But thats not the discussion since it is just about the vehicle it self, if a customer has the choice to use a safe vehicle or an unsafe vehicle which will it choose, it is not that complicated.
That was my only point that customers will stay away from the MAX for the coming period, unless it is redesigned, found safe and probably rebranded to another name.

[KL27x]

Tooki: yeah, ABS might be compulsory on cars in US, now, too. I'm not sure. But I do remember being offered ABS brakes as a ~$500-$1000 option on cars and motorcycles in my day. And I have never ridden a motorcycle with ABS. Point being, until it has been mandated as a requirement, this is ok to do.

AOA were used in commercial planes just to activate a stick shaker until very recently. There was never an AOA display (non military planes). And there was never a reason to need two sensors or double redundancy/agreement to activate a stick shaker stall alert. The stick shaker going off might confuse a pilot the first couple times, but the human response to a stick shaker is unlikely to cause a crash. Only perhaps in zero visibility at low altitude with ASI and/or altimeter both broken and a pilot that still really trusts his stick shaker and does not have the normal human fear of crashing into the ground. This is what the MCAS does; with no input from the horizon, pitch, speed, or thrust, altitude, it will (apparently) blindly respond to AOA sensor. This is why MCAS would need redundancy, per FAA's own guidelines, according to the Seattle Times article.

An AOA display is never going to be super critical in a commercial plane, if not for the MCAS. After a very short takeoff over a mountain, it will tell you that you could take maybe 100 lbs more, next time. But commercial planes are not operated like that. Their weight limit might go up, but it will be through a pile of bureaucracy. AOA display might help Sunday pilots explore the limits of their planes and increase their skills, but commercial pilots aren't allowed to do that. Losing $100 million dollar planes and killing pilots in training would be very costly, nevermind the cost of the fuel. Sticking to strict rules and narrow flight conditions already works fine for passenger transport planes without needing Top Gun pilots. A bus driver might be more capable of handling unusual conditions if Grey Hound taught him how to drift a bus around corners, but that ain't happening, either.

Planes are safer than cars, of course, when adjusted per mile. They travel a lot more in less times. I bet they (commercial) are safer per hour, as well. But even if they weren't safer, they still wouldn't make the top ten list of causes of accidental deaths, because most people don't fly very much, but many people drive several times a week, with a good portion of the world driving at least 5 days a week to work and one day a week to church. You can be captain of a 737 with some thousand of hours of actual flight time. Many of us have spent 100 times that in a car or bus.

[GeorgeOfTheJungle]

it was like nothing else out of Detroit at the time.

That's true, but was a change for the worse. GM fooled you, in Europe we have had many cars like that not because they were better, but because they were cheap!

[Nusa]

[That is what i am saying and take for instance the Ford Pinto which was a very unsafe car because if hit from behind the fueltank could explode was avoided and abandoned by customers.

I remember the Pinto hysteria, and that's what it was to a large extent. It ended up in a massive recall (major at the time, pretty minor by todays standards) to install a plastic barrier and a new filler tube, and people kept driving them for another decade or more (I know of one still on the road today, there are probably a few more). Legal scholars have since written volumes about public perception vs actual facts in the courtroom.

If you actually look at the statistics for fatalities in cars for those years, you'd notice that the Ford Pinto was about average for cars of its type (subcompacts). And it was significantly better than some, such as the VW Beetle or the AMC Gremlin.

[Kjelt]

How far can you go offtopic