It's a common way to sneak around safety by underclassifying the system
Exactly this happens.
It can be said that too ambitious safety standards (especially if they are just very bureaucratically strict, but not very well thought out) work
against safety, because no matter what we want to believe, any design
will go functionality and sales first. People want to travel -> they are given the low-cost service of travelling. Safety standards are lobbied, and whenever lobbying fails or is too slow, sneaking around utilizing grey areas, or outright illegally, is naturally done, it's human nature.
I do have a feeling that the airline safety could actually be
improved by giving a bit more freedom on how the safety is implemented, concentrating on the ideas and results instead of the amount of paperwork only. Not saying paperwork isn't important, it's crucial. But it's a problem if you can document a clearly self-destructing, dangerous system and be OK with it, without a need to fix it. Happens all the time. It's a problem if fixing anything is prohibitively expensive and slow, and thus being avoided as long as possible.
As it stands out, utter fiascos* can go through the current system just fine, but if they wanted to, for example, to install a $10 CCTV camera so they could take a look at the engines or landing gear lock mechanism, improving safety in a simple way, this would require about 20 years of certification after which they could finally install a 20-year old camera that costs $10000 a piece. A slightly exaggerated case, but not by much. For example, looking at the analysis of 2013 Boing Dreamliner li-ion fires, it became apparent they were practically using the li-ion technology from
early 1990's, with no modern cell-level safety features, with energy densities almost on the same level with Ni-MH (around 80Wh/kg IIRC?), but in the aerospace terms, this was the newest "high-tech", and it was
old enough to be allowed on-board. Old is safe, period. Doesn't matter if the actual safety is lacking. Age and paperwork match the expected pattern. They assessed the safety of the tech based on the fact that the manufacturer (GS Yuasa, who's
not well known for lithium ion products) had manufactured
10000 such cells, ever, and none of these had vented, so they thought this is a good track record. Just 10000! The cells were also specified in test procedures to literally produce an actual fire when just overcharged -
none of the consumer cells at the same time had this behavior. Using modern consumer technology, the battery pack would have been two times smaller, possibly with lower thermal runaway energy, with better cell-level safety, and could have been easily equipped with secondary fire mitigation (due to a lot smaller cell size and weight) - for example, simple physical separation to prevent cascading of the failure.
*) Such fiascos as a fault in autothrottle that silently turns left engine to idle randomly near takeoff or landing, which is a sensitive phase of flight - no problem, just instruct every captain to physically block the lever using their hands when they expect it would happen - no need for an urgent fix, no need for groundings. Things like this pop up all the time, most go with little attention; while some like the MCAS get a huge attention for some time, then is forgotten by the public.
Edit: added details regarding Dreamliner battery fires.