Electronics > Projects, Designs, and Technical Stuff
QR codes and speed cameras
cdev:
They probably don't tell people the 'anonymization' is ineffective for economic reasons.
Concerns about privacy might lead many people to not use cell phones, diminishing tracking's effectiveness.
Here is an article in the popular media..
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/10/mac_address_randomization
And here is a paper on the vulnerability.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.02874v1.pdf
--- Quote from: ataradov on January 17, 2019, 02:18:39 am ---
--- Quote from: cdev on January 17, 2019, 01:51:22 am ---But for the purpose of ascertaining traffic speed I think the data they need is there.
--- End quote ---
How? The device generates a random MAC for each scan request. Even if you are sitting in traffic under the same camera for 30 minutes and the phone constantly tries to join the network, all they will get is a lot of random MACs.
--- Quote from: cdev on January 17, 2019, 01:51:22 am ---Also I think I've read that the spoofing they do is ineffective in masking the information (the purpose they claim its done for).
--- End quote ---
Again, this is untrue, unless you have some concrete evidence.
--- End quote ---
ataradov:
That was almost two years ago. Sure, initial implementations suffered from some issues, but those things were fixed a long time ago.
And if your phone vendor does not enable this feature, well, consider another phone, or deal with possible tracking.
The important part is that once this technology was more or less widely available, at least one tracking company went out of business, which shows that is is somewhat effective.
And it is highly unlikely to be integrated into the traffic monitoring equipment, given that cameras and ground loops work just fine for that reason.
cdev:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.02874v1.pdf
Is the anonymization fail fixed?
Do you have proof?
The researchers said that they were able to successfully de-anonymize "100%" of all cell phones that used the 'feature'.
I see no push for privacy by US trans-national corporations.
Do you?
Actually, I know some folk who are experts on this issue and the way they frame it, we have no privacy any more. If you carry a cell phone you can be and are tracked. Even if you don't carry one, and don't drive a car, one's face is now a unique ID.
janoc:
--- Quote from: cdev on January 17, 2019, 04:53:56 am ---Its fixed?
Do you have proof?
The researchers said that they were able to successfully de-anonymize "100%" of all cell phones that used the 'feature'.
I see no push for privacy by US trans-national corporations.
Do you?
Actually, I know some folk who are experts on this issue and the way they frame it, we have no privacy any more. If you carry a cell phone you can be and are tracked. Even if you don't carry one, and don't drive a car, one's face is now a unique ID.
--- End quote ---
Please, not another off-topic conspiracy BS.
Since you are talking about MAC addresses, I assume you mean cellphone wifi and/or bluetooth. These MAC addresses are used to count/track shoppers in shopping malls and such but not cars. Ever heard of a car being an (imperfect) Faraday cage? That would kill any weak wifi or bluetooth signal pretty good.
You have maybe heard about (I believe) New York experiment where they use cell phone location data (or just individual IMEIs, which are likely simpler to get) to count vehicles and measure traffic flows. But cell phone signals are a lot stronger (up to 2W of radiated power) and you don't need to pick them up from the moving cars - you just get the data from the nearest cell tower (or rather the operator's datacenter).
cdev:
Yes, I know about the use of Mac addresses to track traffic but thats not what I was referring to.
It was discovered recently by that algorithms promoted as anonymizing cell phone Mac addresses were not effective and that 100% of them could be determined.
See
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.02874v1.pdf
"7 Conclusions
We provide a detailed breakdown of the randomiza-
tion polices implemented, the associated device mod-
els, and the identification methods thereof. This
granularly detailed decomposition allowed for fine-
tuned improvements to prior attempts at MAC address
derandomization as well as providing novel additions.
Our analysis illustrates that MAC address random-
ization policies are neither universally implemented
nor effective at eliminating privacy concerns.
Table 7 depicts the diversity of presented attacks, across
the spectra of randomization schemes and OSs, high-
lighted by the RTS control frame attack targeting a
widespread low-level chipset vulnerability.
To be truly effective, randomization should be uni-
versally adopted. A continued lack of adoption, al-
lowing for simpler identification, effectively reduces
the problem set for an attacker.
The more devices performing randomization within a test set, the
harder it will be to diffuse each device’s associated
traffic. This is particularly true if we can continue to
bin the various schemes, further reducing the problem set.
We propose the following best practices for MAC
address randomization. Firstly, mandate a universal
randomization policy to be used across the spectra of
802.11 client devices. We have illustrated that when
vendors implement unique MAC address randomiza-
tion schemes it becomes easier to identify and track
those devices. A universal policy must include at
minimum, rules for randomized MAC address byte
structure, 802.11 IE usage, and sequence number be-
havior.
To reiterate, these best practices can only be truly
effective when enforced across the spectrum of de-
vices. Granular examples of such policy rules:
•
Randomize across the entire address, providing
2^46
bits of randomization.
•
Use a random address for every probe request
frame.
•
Remove sequence numbers from probe requests.
•
If sequence numbers are used, reset sequence
number when transmitting authentication and
association frames.
•
Never send probe requests using a global MAC
address.
•
Enforce a policy requiring a minimal and stan-
dard set of vendor IEs. Move any lost function-
ality to the authentication/association process,
or upon network establishment utilize discovery
protocols.
•
Specifically, the use of WPS attributes should
be removed except when performing P2P opera-
tions. Prohibit unique vendor tags such as those
introduced by Apple iOS 10.
•
Eliminate the use of directed probe requests for
cellular offloading.
•
Mandate that chipset firmware remove behavior
where RTS frames received while in State 1 elicit
a CTS response."
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