The problem with that is, some websites/services/networks require you to change the password, after a certain period. That's fine when I'm using it every day. I just increment a number, or letter, but it's a pain with I don't use it very often. I've given up with bothering to remember passwords I don't use regularly and need to be changed often. I just ask for it to be reset every time I long in, which involves receiving an email or text.
yes, in practice these measures can significantly weaken security rather than strengthen it. Forcing regular password changes often leads users to adopt predictable patterns - such as appending a date or incrementing a number, simply to keep track of the changes. This makes the passwords easier to guess and undermines the very purpose of the policy.
Similarly, arbitrary restrictions on password composition (e.g., disallowing certain symbols, requiring a fixed mix of character types, or rejecting perfectly strong passphrases) can push users toward creating long but highly repetitive or formulaic passwords that satisfy the filter yet are far more vulnerable to attack. Worse, these policies often reject genuinely strong passwords for no good reason.
Such rules are often implemented by administrators who have a limited understanding of real-world security issues. I have repeatedly encountered situations where these policies and filters not only created unnecessary headaches for users but also introduced serious vulnerabilities. While to the uninformed they may appear as strict and reasonable measures, in practice they frequently weaken security and create a host of additional problems.
And you would be mistaken to think these issues are hypothetical. I have personally encountered attacks of this kind, where users were subtly steered into choosing easily guessable passwords under the pretext that their original choice failed to meet certain security criteria. Once the weaker password was entered, it was accepted without issue. This is a sophisticated attack method that combines elements of social engineering with a man-in-the-middle approach.
The use of such practices - frequent forced password changes combined with complexity rules - has a troubling parallel to the promotion of biometric authentication. Biometric systems are often marketed as a security enhancement, but in reality they make it easier for malicious actors to impersonate you once they gain access to your biometric data from government or corporate databases. By consenting to the use of biometrics for identity verification, you are in effect giving attackers a permanent "key" that cannot be changed.
What many people fail to realize is that biometrics are not about enhancing security - they are about making impersonation easier for those who manage to obtain your data, money or want to put you into slavery state. Consider this: facial recognition or fingerprint authentication offers no protection if you are coerced or physically restrained. In such a scenario, an attacker could effortlessly unlock every device and service tied to your biometric profile - face, fingerprint, etc. Moreover, stolen biometric data, unlike a password, cannot be reset, and can be traded or sold on illicit markets. So, almost any criminals can use it to impersonate you forever.
The underlying danger of imposing biometrics is that it enables criminals to act in your name, across multiple systems and organizations, without your consent and without your knowledge. Just as flawed password policies can push users into predictable, weak behaviors that aid attackers, biometric systems can provide a single, irrevocable point of failure - only this time, the "password" is something you cannot change.
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