Don't fall into the same trap Boeing is exploiting - some old design or product must be safe because of very few or no incidents over many decades.
The problem with that mindset is any engineering changes bring you back to square one, where you have to evaluate their impact on safety, from scratch. Even though it has the legacy model number, or uses proven physics, that one change can make something unsafe.
Re-evaluating or doing a new safety assessment is time consuming and expensive so it's best to workaround it. This is a common management ploy to rush getting product to market.
Another method is to under-categorize the system change as nothing important, doesn't affect safety, the pilots should be able to handle it, kind of thinking.
You end up with a non-redundant (sensor) MCAS system that flies under the certification radar and avoids the full safety assessment it required.
We don't know the AoA sensor changes over the years, but what cost-improvements have been done to them?
Since 2004, over 200 reports of AoA sensor problems, much fewer for Boeing:
FAA Service Difficulty ReportingWhy are they malfunctioning so often? Cheapness? Killer birds hitting them?
Or an industry content to sit on it's ass and do nothing to improve the design and manufacturing.
If only 0.001% of the litigation dollars was instead spent on R&D towards better AoA sensors.