BTW, I tried installing this Firefox add-on to view the camera directly in the browser but it will not work for me. I would be interested if someone can help me get it to work,
BTW, I tried installing this Firefox add-on to view the camera directly in the browser but it will not work for me. I would be interested if someone can help me get it to work,You still need a VM with an old version of Internet Explorer (that never updates) to configure/view basically any cheap IP camera, due to plugins or Java, but when you see that Axis asks for their stuff. You will accept that.
rtsp://192.168.42.143:554/user=admin_password=neZ3wSSM_channel=1_stream=0.sdp?real_stream That allows me to have a real time video window on the desktop although it will not record.
As this system is intended for my usually vacated summer house, I will not install ethernet cabling. Instead I will place a few cameras here and there, on table tops, powered by the nearest mains socket.
For the NVR/laptop I am trying to understand why not use SSDs instead of special spinning disks for continuous writing.
it seems "iSpy" is being retarded.
Yes but before I buy any more hardware I would like to experiment a bit first, to learn what it is that I need.
I just returned a couple of ieGeek cameras: no onboard web server, PC application does not work, you got to do everything on the phone. They do support ONVIF but only for video and pan/tilt, not for configuration. However video was very clear in light and in dark and the camera panned and tilted quickly and quietly. I think it is the firmware/software that lets these cameras down.
I just returned a couple of ieGeek cameras: no onboard web server, PC application does not work, you got to do everything on the phone. They do support ONVIF but only for video and pan/tilt, not for configuration. However video was very clear in light and in dark and the camera panned and tilted quickly and quietly. I think it is the firmware/software that lets these cameras down.
Onwards looking for a better camera.
That's the frustrating part of home security cameras now, so many proprietary gimmicks that have to be tied to a phone. I hate this trend of everything relying on a phone and app... and an account.
I have not fully researched myself yet, but this one looks decent: https://www.memoryexpress.com/Products/MX72802
I installed iSpy which looks to be absolutely great, unfortunately to use its Web Server capability you must take out a subscription (even though the web server is running on your server...).
Would you be able to suggest an open-source NVR that does not need paid subscription?
The reason for this has been explained. Internet servers help establish the direct connection between both end points.
That's the frustrating part of home security cameras now, so many proprietary gimmicks that have to be tied to a phone. I hate this trend of everything relying on a phone and app... and an account.
I have not fully researched myself yet, but this one looks decent: https://www.memoryexpress.com/Products/MX72802
That's the frustrating part of home security cameras now, so many proprietary gimmicks that have to be tied to a phone. I hate this trend of everything relying on a phone and app... and an account.
I have not fully researched myself yet, but this one looks decent: https://www.memoryexpress.com/Products/MX72802It's gotten so bad manufacturers don't even inform you about requiring an account any more. You have to buy a product to find out you're required to go through their servers to begin using it. It's annoying this is true even for products that don't inherently require external network access.
not that I need that myself just saw an article on one that of course had a security flaw. This whole connected BS is getting out of hand.
This whole connected BS is getting out of hand.
https://www.zdnet.com/article/over-nine-million-cameras-and-dvrs-open-to-apts-botnet-herders-and-voyeurs/
Over nine million cameras and DVRs open to APTs, botnet herders, and voyeurs
Millions of security cameras, DVRs, and NVRs contain vulnerabilities that can allow a remote attacker to take over devices with little effort, security researchers have revealed today.
All vulnerable devices have been manufactured by Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology Co., Ltd. (Xiongmai hereinafter), a Chinese company based in the city of Hangzhou.
But end users won't be able to tell that they're using a hackable device because the company doesn't sell any products with its name on them, but ships all equipment as white label products on which other companies put their logo on top.
Security researchers from EU-based SEC Consult say they've identified over 100 companies that buy and re-brand Xiongmai devices as their own.
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/10/10/vulnerable-xiongmai-cameras/
9 million Xiongmai cameras, DVRs wide open to attack
SEC Consult researchers have issued a warning about a handful of critical vulnerabilities they discovered in video surveillance equipment by Chinese manufacturer Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology.
The discovered vulnerabilities include a default admin password (i.e., no password, and no requirement to set one in the initial setup phase), insecure default credentials for a hardcoded “default” account, multiple unencrypted communication channels, and a failure to check the integrity of firmware updates, which are not signed.
The IDs that allow users to connect to the company’s “XMEye P2P Cloud” and interact with their devices are easily derived from the MAC address of the device, the researchers added, and the connection to the cloud server provider (which is enabled by default) is not encrypted. There is also no information on who runs those servers and where they are located.
And finally, to top it all, they found that the P2P Cloud feature bypasses firewalls and allows remote connections into private networks.
Xiongmai-manufactured devices were among those that were conscripted into Mirai IoT botnets in 2016, as they offered high-privileged shell access over TCP ports 23 and 9527 using hard-coded credentials.
Xiongmai eventually fixed those vulnerabilities, the researchers say, but they have yet to do so with this latest batch, despite them sharing the information with the company back in March 2018.
With these vulnerabilities unpatched, attackers could find and target exposed devices to perform a wide variety of attacks.
They can spy on users of Xiongmai surveillance products, even listen in on conversations and interact with victims when the devices have a two-way audio intercom. They can “zombify” the devices and make them part of botnets. They can deliver malicious firmware to them. They can gain an initial foothold into a targeted local network.
OK, but if we assume that all cameras are small computers, running a mini-OS (or maybe, not so "mini"), and this OS is infested with security backdoors and compromises. So we need to have these cameras on a quarantined LAN, or somehow prevent them from accessing the internet.